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WELCOME
PROF. KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
For those of you who have never met Dean Treanor,4 I don't want
you to think that he has aged prematurely. I am not Dean Treanor. He
is in Washington, D.C., attending to School business. He has asked me
to welcome you on his behalf to this, the Ninth Albert DeStefano
Lecture.
Unfortunately, the DeStefano family could also not be with us to-
night. They also send their regrets, along with their warmest regards.
These lectures are sponsored by the firm of Becker Ross.' With us
tonight is a member of the firm, Howard Justvig, 6 Class of 1976.
[Applause]
The lecture series bearing Al's name has had a most distinguished
track record.
For those of you who have never met Al DeStefano,7 let me briefly
describe him to you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review
and graduate at the top of his class. He accomplished all this with a de-
meanor of kindness, humility, and great integrity.
By honoring Al DeStefano with this lecture series, Fordham honors
itself. Through this series of lectures we hope to remind ourselves of
our mission, to produce skilled professionals of character, integrity, and
compassion, characteristics that epitomize the life and career of Al
DeStefano.
Since its inception less than a decade ago, the DeStefano Lectures
have covered a wide range of timely yet diverse topics, such as the need
for market regulation, the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur
Andersen, strengthening protection for investors, and making our capital
markets more transparent.8
4. William M. Treanor is the Dean of Fordham University School of Law.
William Treanor-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/I 148.htm.
5. Becker Ross, LLP is a law firm located in New York, N.Y. See
http://www.martindale.com/Becker-Ross-LLP/453257-law-firm-office.htm.
6. See Howard Justvig-Biography, http://www.martindale.com/Howard-Justvig/
453269-lawyer.htm.
7. Albert A. DeStefano-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/corporate-law-
center/7317.htm.
8. See Fordham Law Corporate Law Center, Highlights of Prior Programs,
2009 DESTEFANO LECTURE: 3
IS CHAPTER XI DEAD?
After forty-five years of teaching tax, I can appreciate that tax
practitioners tend to become narrow-minded and nitpickers. I did not
suspect, however, that the same affliction has spread to the bankruptcy
bar as well.
In my notice to my friends in referring to tonight's topic, I didn't
like the Arabic number 11. It is too reminiscent of the tragedy of 9/11 or
the gambler's phrase "seven/eleven," or the name of the convenience
store by the same name. Therefore, in exercising my First Amendment
privileges, I thought I would refer to Chapter 11 using Roman numerals.
I thqught this would be classier, attract more attention, and justify the
years of Latin I took as a student at Xavier High School.
Well, you'd think I had violated the sacred code of insolvency. I
received numerous nasty calls from bankruptcy practitioners who
chastised me for taking the liberty with the Holy text of the Bankruptcy
Code, whose chapters are expressed in Arabic numerals.
After serious reflection and much soul searching, I respectfully
responded to my critics: "If Roman numerals are good enough for the
Romans, it's good enough for the bankruptcy bar also."
A brief word about our Corporate Law Center. These lectures are
organized by the Center and are published and will be published in the
Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law. 9
The Chairman of our Corporate Center is Paul Soden, ° who will
have the pleasure of introducing tonight's speaker.
I would also at this time like to acknowledge the extraordinary
service of Professor Caroline Gentile,' 0 who is with us here tonight, and
Ann Rakoff", who is the Executive Director of our Corporate Center,
who makes things happen. They don't happen accidentally.
[Applause]
Before I introduce Paul Soden, however, I would like to highlight a
point of personal pride. I had the extreme pleasure and privilege of
having taught tonight's speaker, Judge Bernstein, in tax, as well as the
Judge's wife Andrea and his son Jonathan, all graduates of this Law
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/priorprograms.html.
9. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, http://law.fordham.edu/
fordham-journal-of-corporate-financial-law/jcfl.htm.
10. See supra note 2.
10. Caroline Gentile-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/10019.htm.
11. Ann Rakoff is the Executive Director of Fordham Corporate Law Center. See
Fordham Corporate Law Center, Contacts, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/
fisch/contact.html.
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School.
Without further ado, I would now like to call upon Paul Soden, who
was a student of mine over forty years ago.
[Applause]
Paul, it seems like yesterday, at least to me anyhow.
Paul will tell you a little bit about our Center and introduce
tonight's speaker.
Paul.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
MR. SODEN: I was hoping to be able to get up after being
introduced as a student from forty years ago.
I have one housekeeping detail. Those of you who were in Room
122 before this event, your belongings have been moved to the coatroom
in the front of the Atrium.
Thank you for that wonderful introduction, Gus.
Good evening and welcome to all of you. I thank all of you for
taking your valuable time to be with us here this evening.
Tonight we have the privilege of hearing this year's DeStefano
Lecture, to be delivered by Stuart Bernstein, Chief Judge of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.
Before I introduce Judge Bernstein, let me tell you a little bit about
the Fordham Corporate Law Center, which is the host for tonight's
event.
The Corporate Law Center was founded in 2001 to serve as a focal
point for excellence and innovation in business law. 12 Through its activ-
ities and programs, the Center draws together academicians, practi-
tioners, managers, legislators, regulators, judges, and students to explore
current and emerging topics in business law. In this way the Center
seeks to enhance our understanding of both business law and business
and to influence public policy debates and legal debates regarding the
global economy and international financial markets.
After the Lecture, please take a moment to stop by the registration
table in the Atrium - I kept thinking I would say "registration statement
in the Atrium." At that table there is detailed information about the
12. Fordham Corporate Law Center, http://law.fordham.edu/corporatelawcenter/
corporatecenter.htm.
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Corporate Law Center's programs and public lectures and copies of the
Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, a specialized
business law journal that was cited in a U.S. Supreme Court decision in
the Arthur Andersen case. 13
We hope you will enjoy tonight's Lecture and return for many more
of our programs in the future. So if you haven't registered with us,
please do so at that table or leave your business card so that we can alert
you to programs for the future.
We have a very, very distinguished audience here tonight. At the
risk of not mentioning someone-and I beg everyone's forgiveness who
I leave out as I go along here-let me take a minute or two to recognize
some of the luminaries in our audience. By the way, as far as I'm con-
cerned, you're all luminaries.
First, the Fordham Law School faculty and administrators who are
here this evening: Dean Sheila Foster, 4 Dean Mike Schiumo, 15 Dean
Bob Reilly, 16 Professor Susan Block-Lieb, 7 Professor Carl Felsenfeld, 8
and Professor Sean Griffith.'9
[Applause]
I also wish to recognize the members of our Corporate Center's
Board of Advisors, and I thank them for their generous support of the
2 22Center. With us are Pam Chepiga,2 ° Bob Hollweg,2' Gian Laguzza,
the Honorable Loretta Preska, 23 and Howard Tuckman, Dean of the
13. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
14. Sheila Foster-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/10003.htm.
15. Dean Michael Schiumo is Assistant Dean for Alumni Relations at Fordham
Law School. Development and Alumni Relations Staffhttp://law.fordham.edu/
alumni/7562.htm.
16. Dean Robert J. Reilly is Assistant Dean for the Feerick Center at Fordham Law
School. Robert J. Reilly-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/feerick-center/1 860.htm.
17. Susan Block-Lieb-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/1078.htm.
18. Carl Felsenfeld-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/9991.htm.
19. Sean Griffith-Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/1102.htm.
20. Pam Chepiga-Biography, http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/People
Offices/CVDetails.aspx?contentTypeID=4&itemlD=292 1 &prefLangID=4 10.
21. Robert W. Hollweg is a Fordham Law School Alumnus and member of the
Fordham Law School 1905 Society. See 1905 Society, http://law.fordham.edu/
alumni/1495.htm.
22. Gian-Carlo Laguzza is a Fordham Law School Alumnus. See Press Release,
Fordham University, Panel Examines Wall Street's Ethical Decay (Nov. 21, 2002),
http://www.fordham.edu/campus-resources/enewsroom/archives/archive_256. asp.
23. Honorable Loretta A. Preska-Biography, http://wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/
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Fordham Graduate School of Business.24
Additionally, we have with us tonight Dr. Stephen Freedman,
Senior Vice President and Chief Academic Officer of Fordham Univer-
sity. 25
And as if that were not already a star-studded group, I also extend a
special welcome to the esteemed judges of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York who have joined us for this
evening.
[Applause]
And of course the Center gratefully acknowledges the law firm of
Becker Ross for their generosity in establishing the Albert DeStefano
Lecture Series here at the Law School.
There is one person I must single out for recognition. Without this
person's extraordinary dedication, ingenuity, and hard work we would
not have had this evening's program. I thank Ann Rakoff,26 the Director
of the Corporate Center, for her tremendous contribution to the success
of this event.
[Applause]
And now to the main event. On behalf of the Corporate Center, I
am delighted to introduce our distinguished speaker.
Stuart Bernstein became a judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of
the Southern District of New York in 199327 and was appointed Chief
Judge on February 1, 2000.28 Prior to his appointment to the bench he
had a distinguished career in both private practice and as a U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York.29
Chief Judge Bernstein is a member of the Association of the Bar of
judgeinfo.php?id=26.
24. See Press Release, Fordham University, Tuckman Named Dean of Graduate
School of Business, (May 5, 2006), http://www.fordham.edu/campusresources/
enewsroom/archives/archive 673.asp.
25. Stephen Freedman-Biography, Office of the Senior Vice President/Chief
Academic Officer, http://www.fordham.edu/academics/office-of the-senior/.
26. See Fordham Corporate Law Center, Contacts, http://www.fordham.edu/law/
faculty/fisch/contact.html.
27. Stuart M. Bernstein, Chief Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York-Biography, http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/judges/
smb.htm1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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the City of New York,3° the Federal Bar Council,31 and the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.3 2 He also serves as a Fellow of the
American College of Bankruptcy 33 and as a member of the International
Insolvency Institute.34
Chief Judge Bernstein is the author of many noted articles and also
lectures on behalf of many professional organizations 35 , including
ALI/ABA, the American Bankruptcy Institute, the New York State Bar
Association, and the Georgetown Law Center.
Chief Judge Bernstein holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree Cum Laude
from Queens College3 6 and received his Juris Doctor Degree Cum
Laude from our own Fordham Law School.37
As Chief Judge, he presides over the largest and most sophisticated
branch of the federal bankruptcy courts. By virtue of its location in
Manhattan, the Southern District Bankruptcy Court regularly handles the
largest and most complex bankruptcy proceedings anywhere in the
world. Enron and WorldCom are but two examples. 38 Now, in the cur-
rent economic crisis, the Bankruptcy Court has become ever more the
focus of the most compelling economic issues that confront our nation.
Chief Judge Bernstein is celebrated for his expertise. The Almanac
of the Federal Judiciary says: "Lawyers rave about Judge Bernstein's
legal skills, 39 and his speaking skills are no less highly regarded.
Tonight Chief Judge Bernstein will bring his wide-ranging exper-
tise to bear on whether corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is still a viable possibility in the circumstances we
face today.
30. New York City Bar, http://www.nycbar.org/index.htm.
31. Federal Bar Council, http://www.federalbarcouncil.org/.
32. National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, http://www.ncbj.org/.
33. See Honorable Stuart M. Bernstein-Biography, http://www.iiiglobal.org/
administrator/components/comjuser/upload files/sbernstein@iiiglobal.org_203bemst
ein.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, Enron
Corp. Bankruptcy Information, http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/enron.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2009); and WorldCom, Inc. Bankruptcy Information,
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/worldcom.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
39. See ASPEN PUBLISHERS, 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 2d Cir.
S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 100 (2009) (profile of the Honorable Stuart M. Bernstein).
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It is an honor and privilege to welcome you to our podium, Chief
Judge Bernstein.
LECTURE: Is CHAPTER XI DEAD?
JUDGE BERNSTEIN: Thank you very much, Paul. Had I known
we'd get this turnout, I would have prepared.
[Laughter]
My topic tonight is "Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization."
Frank Borman, the former astronaut and Chairman of Eastern Air-
lines, once remarked that "capitalism without bankruptcy is like
Christianity without hell." 40
[Laughter]
Maybe I should be done now.
Bankruptcy recognizes that default is a necessary evil in any system
based on credit. -One of America's great contributions to the law was the
idea that failure did not necessarily mean death. Through bankruptcy re-
organization, a company in financial distress could be resuscitated and
continue in business.
Some, however, contend that this is no longer true. They argue that
Chapter 11, our principal reorganization law, has changed from a pro-
ceeding that once promoted business reorganizations to one that now
facilitates the quick sale of the debtor's assets followed by the liquid-
dation of the debtor.4'
Thus, Professors Baird and Robert Rasmussen remarked in a 2002
Law Review article: "To the extent that we understand the law of cor-
porate reorganizations as providing a collective forum in which creditors
and their common debtor fashion a future for a firm that would other-
wise be torn apart by financial distress, we may safely conclude that that
era has come to an end.",42
The quote suggests that Chapter 11 is dead or, at a minimum, no
longer meets its original objectives. To a great extent this is true. How-
40. Alexander L. Taylor III, The Growing Bankruptcy Brigade; American
Companies Are Now Failing at the Rate of 500 a Week, TIME, Oct. 18, 1982, at 90.
41. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 751, 751-52 (2002) [hereinafter End of Bankruptcy].
42. Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy 2 (Chicago:
John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 173 (2d Series)), available at http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/173.dgb_.bankruptcy.end_..pdf.
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ever, as Mark Twain observed in a similar context, the reports of
Chapter I l's death may be an exaggeration.43 If you give me roughly
thirty minutes, I'll try to explain why.
I propose to begin with a discussion of the origin and development
of reorganization law leading up to the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code and then talk about how Chapter 11 has changed.
Historically, bankruptcy was a quasi-criminal remedy that had the
following characteristics:
* It was a creditor's remedy. In other words, there were no vol-
untary bankruptcies."
- It was directed against merchants; ordinary individuals couldn't
be bankrupt.45
" It was limited to liquidation; there was no reorganization. 46
" It was generally codified.47
In the early days, it could be very, very harsh. For example, in
medieval Italy a merchant's creditors would come to the market and
break his workbench. While the remedy has fallen out of favor, the bro-
ken bench, in Latin bancus ruptus, is the linguistic origin of the term
bankruptcy.48
Bankrupts were also subject to imprisonment, the pillory, and the
lopping off of their ears. And for approximately 115 years English law
provided the death penalty for fraudulent bankrupts. Think of how pop-
ular that would be today.
[Laughter]
This was the state of the law when the United States Constitution
authorized Congress to enact uniform bankruptcy laws throughout the
United States. 49 As a matter of fact, Roger Sherman of Connecticut op-
posed the Bankruptcy Clause because he feared it would authorize the
43. Referring to Mark Twain's famous remark, "[t]he report of my death was an
exaggeration." See BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 528 (16th ed. 1992) (originally
published in a Note to a London correspondent of the New York Journal, June 1, 1897).
44. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Law in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 7 (1995).
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id.at8,20-21.
47. Id. at 7-8, 10, 12-13.
48. Charles Kerr, The Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, 15 VA. L.
REv. 350, 367 (1929).
49. Tabb, supra note 44, at 12-13.
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government to impose the death penalty.50
As attitudes toward credit changed over time, compensation
replaced retribution as the goal of bankruptcy law. During the 19th
century America enacted four bankruptcy laws,5 the first three lasting a
total of only sixteen years before they were repealed by popular
demand. 52
But neither these laws nor the Bankruptcy Clause have anything to
do with the origin or the development of reorganization law. Instead,
the law of corporate reorganization originated independently as a
common law device to fill a need that bankruptcy law, when there was
one, just couldn't handle.
By the middle of the 19th century, America's railroads, our first
great corporations, were growing at a rapid rate. They were also failing
at a rapid rate, or starting to fail at a rapid rate. 53 Everybody agreed that
the railroads were necessary and had to keep running.5 4 In addition,
they weren't worth much in liquidation. The typical railroad had issued
several series or traunches of bonds, each traunch secured by a discrete
section of track and other assets.55 So your bond might be secured by
six miles or six feet or 600 miles of track in the middle or nowhere.
Your mortgage was essentially worthless unless your collateral was part
of an operating railroad system. 56
To meet this situation, the railroad lawyers borrowed from the com-
mon law of foreclosure and receivership law and crafted the equity
receivership, which is the direct descendent of modem reorganization
law. 57
In a nutshell, here's how it worked. Following a bond default, a
creditor filed a creditor's bill and the federal court appointed a receiver
to oversee the railroad's property. The railroad's management partic-
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id.
53. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights,
and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921,
925 (2001) [hereinafter Control Rights].
54. See Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Greenville & W.R. Co., 248 F. 350, 352
(W.D.S.C. 1917) (stating that the interests of the public make the railroad service im-
perative).
55. End of Bankruptcy, supra note 41, at 759.
56. Control Rights, supra note 53, at 927.
57. End of Bankruptcy, supra note 41, at 759.
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ipated in the ongoing operation of the railroad because the creditors and
the court thought that their experience was valuable. A creditor would
then file a foreclosure bill. Creditors formed committees, called pro-
tective committees, and deposited their bonds or securities with the
protective committee. Once the committees negotiated a plan, the court
scheduled the sale, the committee credited the face amount of the debt,
won the auction, and the creditors became the new owners of the
railroad.58
One overarching idea drove the equity receivership practice: the
railroad was more valuable as a going concern than in liquidation, a
fairly novel concept for the courts at the time. 59 This belief, shared by
the stakeholders in the case, was instrumental in the success of the rail-
road receiverships and became the bedrock principle of reorganization
law.
The principles of corporate reorganization were first codified in the
early years of the Great Depression and eventually enacted as part of the
Chandler Act of 1938.60 The Chandler Act had three reorganization
chapters: X, XI, and XII, written as Roman numerals.
Chapter X, largely drafted by the SEC, was meant to deal with the
reorganization of large publicly owned corporations with complex
capital and debt structures.6'
Its history is an interesting story by itself and may sound familiar in
light of current events. By this time, the Great Depression, there was
enormous suspicion and distrust surrounding the equity receiverships in
the reorganization bar.62 The equity receivership was developed by
Wall Street lawyers, and many believed primarily for their benefit and
the investment banks that had underwritten the bonds and who they
represented.63
The reorganization bar was the most elite in the nation. Paul
Cravath was one of the leading reorganization lawyers of his time. Most
58. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (outlining reorganization
procedure plaintiff followed); see also Tabb, supra note 44, at 22.
59. See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135-36 (noting that the liquidation of a
railroad would be to the detriment of the public as well as creditors).
60. Tabb, supra note 44, at 22.
61. See Barbara E. Nelan, Multiple Plans "On the Table" During the Chapter 11
Exclusivity Period, 6 BANK. DEV. J. 451, 459-60 (discussing Chapter X).
62. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 258-59 (Yale Univ.
Press 1937).
63. Control Rights, supra note 53, at 934.
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of the cases included the predecessors of Cravath, Swaine & Moore,
Sullivan & Cromwell, or Davis Polk.64
Ironically, the reorganization bar's chief nemesis was a former
Cravath associate who had worked on railroad reorganizations, William
Douglas. Douglas was by now a Yale law professor. He was selected
by the SEC to head the study on protective committees, which were
often dominated by insiders of the railroad. 65 Aided by his second in
command, Abe Fortas, Douglas, who eventually became the SEC Chair-
man, produced a multi-volume scathing report 66 directed at the Wall
Street domination of the reorganization practice, the cozy connection
between the reorganization professionals and the railroad's management,
and the payment of excessive fees.
The populous mistrust of Wall Street, the New Deal reform atmos-
phere, and the heavy Democratic majorities in Congress led to the
adoption of Chapter X of the Chandler Act. 67
Generally, Chapter X displaced management, put control of the
case in the hands of a mandatory trustee, and gave the SEC a substantial
role.68 For these reasons it wasn't especially popular for a corporation
contemplating reorganization.69
In contrast, new Chapter XI (that's also Roman numerals) was
designed for smaller, privately owned businesses and was much kinder
and gentler .70 The debtor remained in control of the assets of the case,
no trustee was appointed, and the debtor had an unlimited right to
propose a plan, total exclusivity. 71 However, Chapter XI offered more
limited relief and, in particular, the Chapter XI debtor couldn't reor-
64. See, e.g., ROBERT T. SWAINE, II THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS
167-97 (Ad Press, Ltd., 1948); see also NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK LiPsius, A LAW
UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LAW FIRM SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 31
(1988).
65. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 255-56 (Random House New York 1974).
66. SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel
and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees (May 10, 1937), available
at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1937_0510_SEC_003.pdf.
67. See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option For Distressed Businesses For The Twenty-First Century?, 78
AM. BANKR. L.J. 153,167-69 (Spring 2004).
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id. at 170.
70. Id.
71. Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75.696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
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ganize its secured debt in Chapter XI.7 2
And finally, the Chandler Act also included Chapter XII, which
dealt with certain types of real estate bankruptcies.7 3
Everyone understood that public companies were supposed to file
under Chapter X, but nothing in the Chandler Act specifically required
them to file under Chapter X as opposed to Chapter XI. It should come
as no surprise that corporate managers of public companies opted for
Chapter XI, and in a variation on Gresham's Law, Chapter X1 was
driving Chapter X out of use.74 The SEC often fought the debtor's
selection, but with only limited success.
In the process, Chapter XI was transformed from a proceeding
intended for mom-and-pop businesses into a chapter used by Fortune
500 companies. In 1975, W.T. Grant Company, a publicly traded corpo-
ration, became the first billion-dollar company to file a Chapter XI
case. 75
The Chandler Act lasted for forty years, until the adoption of the
current Bankruptcy Code in 1978. The 1978 law merged the three re-
organization chapters into a single one under Chapter 11 (Arabic
Chapter 11).
Chapter 11 incorporated many of the debtor-friendly provisions of
the old Chapter XI and rejected the more unpopular aspects of Chapter
x. 7
6
Under new Chapter 11, the debtor's management remained in
possession, trustees and examiners were appointed only for cause, the
role of the SEC was substantially reduced, the debtor enjoyed limited
exclusivity that the court could, and often did, extend for cause.77 The
plan could reorganize all type of debt. Creditors could waive the abso-
lute priority rule. 78 The plan proponent could cram a plan down in many
cases over the rejection by a class.79
72. Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 170.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 171.
75. Id. at 172.
76. Id. at 176.
77. Id. at 176-77.
78. See Allan C. Eberhart & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Importance of Deviations
from the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 27 FIN. MGMT.
106, 107 (1998) (noting that previous researchers all acknowledge that creditors may
waive their priority rights).
79. See John C. Murray, The Lender's Guide to Single Asset Real Estate
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The 1978 Code80 was based on the railroad paradigm [that] a com-
pany was worth more alive than dead. 8' In addition, although max-
imizing creditor recoveries was certainly an important goal, it was not
the only goal, nor necessarily the most important. Thus, it surprised no
one when the Supreme Court in its 1984 Bildisco decision that "the
fundamental purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going
into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of
economic resources. 82
So this was the state of the law in 1978. Under the new Chapter 11,
the debtor was not just in possession, it was in charge. Ideally, it
reached an agreement with its creditors, confirmed the plan, and
emerged from Chapter 11 with the same owners. The employees kept
their jobs and the trade vendors kept a customer.
Chapter 11 filings quickly rose to five times the annual filings
under the three reorganization chapters during the final years of the
Chandler Act.83
And then two things happened to Chapter 11, although not neces-
sarily connected.
First, starting in the mid-1990s, Chapter 11 filings began to decline
at a fairly steep rate.84 The sharp decline, particularly in the last few
years, may be explained by the increased availability of credit, and re-
flect that until recently companies could manage to borrow their way out
of immediate financial distress.85 I'll leave it at that.
Bankruptcies, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 393, 461 (1996) (noting that a plan can be
forced on the impaired class that votes against the plan if it does not discriminate
unfairly and is fair and equitable to the dissenting class).
80. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330).
81. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 154 (commending the railroad
paradigm as a "new line of thought" and a "novel, highly successful concept of reorg-
anization and rehabilitation").
82. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
83. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy
Filing Rate: A Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 14 (1993).
84. Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 1] in Transition-From Boom to Bust and into the
Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 384 (2007) [hereinafter Chapter 11 in Transition]
("Stated differently, in 1994, 1.77% of total bankruptcy cases filed were chapter 11
cases. In 2003, that figure was 57%.").
85. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Easy Credit and Depression, WALL. ST. J., May 4,
2009, at A15 (reviewing RiCHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS
OF '08 AND THE DESCENT rN'rO DEPRESSION (2009)).
2009 DESTEFANO LECTURE: 15
IS CHAPTER XI DEAD?
Second, and of greater concern, the character of the cases changed.
Creditors began to exert more influence and many more cases
culminated in the sale of the debtor's assets followed by the liquidation
of the debtor.86
The question is: What caused these changes? Several reasons have
been given. Let me suggest three.
The first is what we call the clawback. Many trade associations and
organized creditor groups thought the Code was too debtor-friendly and
lobbied for changes. Beginning in 1984, Congress started to clawback
the rights and powers granted to the debtor.8 7 Since then, it has enacted
a host of special-interest legislation that has favored various creditor
groups or other constituencies at the expense of the debtor and the
reorganization process. 88 These include, among others, commercial les-sors, 89 personal property lessors,90 aircraft lessors,9' shopping center
owners, 92 financial institutions, 93 unions, 94 and retirees. 9' I can't think
of any pro-debtor change during the same period.
The amendments relating to the commercial leases provide a stark
example of the effect of these amendments. The 1978 Code gave the
debtor until confirmation to assume or reject is unexpired leases. 96 Sub-
sequent amendments reduced the debtor's time97 and severely restricted
the court's authority to extend it no matter what the circumstances. 98
The debtor now gets at most 210 days to assume or reject unless the
86. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REv. 673, 675, 691 (2003) [hereinafter Chapter 11 at Twilight] (noting that
"creditor control is the dominant theme" and that "the dominant feature of the large
corporate Chapter 11 today is the asset sale").
87. See Chapter 11 in Transition, supra note 84, at 387-88; Harvey R. Miller &
Shai Y. Waisman, Is an Imperfect Chapter 11 the Best of All Alternatives?, 15 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, art. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Imperfect Chapter 11].
88. See Chapter 11 in Transition, supra note 84, at 387-88.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 178.
92. Chapter 11 in Transition, supra note 84, at 387-88.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 178-79.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(A) (2006).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(B)(ii).
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landlord consents to a longer extension.99 This sounds like enough time,
but it may not be. The decision to assume or reject may depend on the
outcome of litigation with the landlord, or in a more complex case
involving a chain of retail stores with hundreds of leases the decision
may depend on the availability of financing and how the lease fits into
the debtor's business plans. 00
These factors are no longer relevant. Absent landlord consent to
further extensions, the debtor must make its assumption/rejection deci-
sion. 10 And if it can't make the decision to assume, it will lose its lease,
and quite possibly its business.
Another recent change drastically affects the debtor's liquidity.
Prior to the 2005 amendments, any vendor that delivered goods pre-
petition was an unsecured creditor subject to any reclamation rights that
the vendor might have. 0 2 The 2005 amendments grant administrative
claim status to vendors that deliver goods within twenty days of the
petition date in the ordinary course of business.'03 This means that those
vendors have to be paid in full no later than confirmation.' 04
In testimony before Congress earlier this month, the attorney for the
Creditors Committee in the Circuit City case identified this change as a
substantial factor in the failure of the case. 05 Pre-petition vendors in
that case had filed administrative claims totaling $350 million, which the
debtor estimated would come in at $215 million. 0 6 The debtor just
didn't have the time to resolve these claims and the money to pay the
ones that would ultimately be allowed. 07
Although the clawback has hurt the chance to reorganize, the more
significant changes have occurred outside the Bankruptcy Code.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4).
100. In re Linens Holding Co., No. 08-10832, 2009 WL 2163235 (Bankr. D. Del.
June 12, 2009) (Delaware judge approves the sale of nine of Linens 'N Things Inc.'s
leases).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2006).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 546.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 503(B)(9).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 503(B)(9).
105. Circuit City Unplugged. Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 4, 25, 53-54 (2009) (statement of Richard M. Pachulski, repre-
sentative of creditors committee of Circuit City).
106. Id. at26, 113.
107. Id. at 26.
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Nowadays a debtor usually enters Chapter 11 over-leveraged, cash
strapped, and its assets fully encumbered.'08  Only the pre-petition
lender will provide V.I.P. financing, often as a defensive measure to
protect its collateral. 109
The lender has enormous bargaining power, which it uses to impose
terms that restrict the debtor's power to propose a plan without the
lender's consent; °" 0 establish deadlines, and usually short ones, to file a
plan or sell the debtor's assets; 1 limit disbursements to those approved
by the lender;" 2 and require the debtor to hire a chief restructuring
officer (CRO)." 3  The CRO is a person approved by the lender who
serves as a de facto trustee with the authority to circumvent manage-
ment, make executive decisions, and negotiate with the various
constituencies on behalf of the debtor. 114
This situation has spawned the phenomenon known as the "creditor
in possession." Control of the case passes to the secured lender and the
debtor, effectively neutralized, often becomes a bystander."'
Secured creditors usually prefer a quick sale of the debtor's assets
to a drawn-out reorganization process because they are concerned that
their collateral will decline over time. That's why they imposed dead-
lines in the DIP financing agreement. 116
As a result, the sale under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code has
become the exit strategy of choice in many Chapter 11 cases.l"' In fact,
many sales are negotiated pre-petition and the bankruptcy is filed in
order to effectuate the transaction. 118
Distressed claims trading has also influenced the prospects of a suc-
cessful reorganization. Claims traders buy claims to make a profit, and
in some cases to acquire control of the bankruptcy case.1 9
108. Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 182.
109. Id. at 185.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Miller & Waisman, supra note 67, at 185-86.
114. Id. at 186-87.
115. Id. at 198.
116. Id. at 182, 185.
117. Id. at 194-95.
118. Chapter II at Twilight, supra note 86, at 675.
119. Donald S. Bernstein, U.S. Chapter 11 Today: A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Court-house, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE To:
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Before claims trading, the debtor's vendors, who were the creditors,
had an interest in keeping the debtor in business as a customer. Traders
that buy the vendors' claims do not have the same interest. Furthermore,
whatever their motive, the sooner the debtor exits Chapter l Ithe sooner
the trader can turn its investment into cash.
The pressure to emerge from Chapter 11 early, perhaps too early,
may be a contributing factor to recidivism, the filing of a so-called
Chapter 22, and sometimes a Chapter 33.
So does creditor control and more Section 363 sales followed by
liquidation mean that Chapter 11 is no longer necessary or viable as a
means of reorganizing a business? I'm not convinced that it's ready for
the trash heap.
In the first case, there are companies that still reorganize the old-
fashioned way: 120 they make a deal with their creditors and emerge as
an operating company with the same management.
Even where the property is sold, Chapter 11 adds value. The debtor
can transfer the property, possibly as a going concern, free and clear of
liens and interests. 121 In addition, the debtor can assume and assign its
leases as part of a sale, despite the existence of lease provisions that
prohibit or restrict assignment. 122
Our experience with bankruptcy sales also undercuts the argument
made by some that the railroad paradigm no longer exists and that we
can no longer assume that the assets of a going concern are more valu-
able than those in liquidation. 123
Critics of Chapter 11 contend that in a service-based economy a
company's hard assets generally consist of office furniture and com-
puters. 124 Unlike railroad tracks that were dedicated to the railroad's
business, the same office furniture and computers can be used in any
CORPORATE RECOVERY & INSOLVENCY 2007 5 (Global Legal Group Ltd. 2007),
available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/1215.pdf.
120. Chapter 11 at Twilight, supra note 86, at 683 (stating that the 2002 bankruptcy
of Pillowtex Corp. "on its face... support[s the traditional account of Chapter 11" as
the company emerged from bankruptcy and continued to run the sample plants, employ
the same workers, and so forth).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 363(1).
123. See generally Michael J. Alderson & Brian L. Betker, Assessing Post-
Bankruptcy Performance: An Analysis of Reorganized Firms " Cash Flows, 28 FIN.
MGMT. 68 (1999).
124. The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 41, at 766.
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service business. The only going-concern premium in such a business is
the relatively small cost of deploying the assets, getting them from point
A to B and assembling them in the business.
Practice suggests, however, that the bankruptcy stakeholders still
believe in the railroad paradigm and conduct themselves accordingly.
It's the rare secured creditor that wants its collateral back pursuant to its
pre-petition agreement. 125 Rather, the secured creditor prefers to sell its
collateral in the bankruptcy court as part of a going-concern sale of the
entire business. 126
To obtain this benefit the secured creditor is willing to fund the
administrative expenses of the case, which can be substantial. 127  In
short, the creditor puts its money where its mouth is in the belief that
Chapter 11 will maximize recovery.
Finally, not all Section 363 sales are necessarily bad or inconsistent
with the objectives of Chapter 11. A sale doesn't mean that the auction-
eer comes into the factory and sells the assets one light bulb at a time.
As I have indicated, sales can transfer all, or substantial all, of the assets
as a going concern. In that situation, the business continues to operate in
the hands of a new owner, employing many or all of the debtor's former
employees.
Let me give you an example from my own experience. One of the
first cases I had involved a department store chain of around thirty
stores. 128 After the debtor tried unsuccessfully to develop a standalone
plan, it decided to sell its assets, its operating stores.
There were several bidders at the auction. In the end, two depart-
ment store chains purchased most of the stores. The stores continued to
operate under new ownership and new names, most of the employees
kept their jobs, and the unsecured creditors ultimately recovered 84
125. See generally PATRICK E. MEARS ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR SECURED CREDITORS
IN WORKOUTS AND FORECLOSURES 278 (John B. Spitzer ed., A.L.I.-A.B.A. 2004)
(noting that while some secured creditors will liquidate their collateral immediately in a
going-concern sale, the hope for enhanced recovery often compels the lender to
negotiate with the other constituencies).
126. Id.
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006) (authorizing the trustee in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding to recover reasonable expenses from property securing a secured claim in a
transaction that benefits the holder of such claim).
128. Press Release, Strick & Co., Update Regarding May/Penney Purchase of
Woodward & Lothrop (Aug. 9, 1995) (announcing the Honorable Stuart M. Bernstein's
approval of the sale of retailer Woodward & Lothrop's assets to a consortium).
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percent.
Critics of Chapter 11 would probably view the sale of the assets and
the liquidation of the debtor as an example of what's wrong with
Chapter 11.129 1 would call it a pretty good result consistent with the
goals of Chapter 11.
In conclusion, I agree that Chapter 11 has changed, generally to the
benefit of the creditors and at the expense of the debtor and the chances
for reorganization.
To return Chapter 11 to its roots, I suppose, Congress would have
to claw back the clawback, restrict the rights of secured creditors or
create a source of unsecured DIP financing, and limit or outlaw claims
trading. None of these are likely to happen.
Yet, Chapter 11 can, and often does, serve its intended goals of re-
organization and job preservation. Going-concern sales under Section
363 can transfer an operating business to new owners. Frankly, there is
little difference between that result and the confirmed reorganization
plan that extinguishes the existing equity and issues new stock to the
creditors. In fact, that's essentially what happened in the railroad receiv-
ership cases.
Chapter 11 isn't perfect, and some contend it's outdated. But as
long as we have credit we will have defaults. I haven't heard a better
alternative to Chapter 11, and, based on today's newspaper stories about
the automotive industry, a lot of people seem to agree.
Perhaps Winston Churchill's observation about democracy applies
here. Chapter 11 may be the worst method for dealing with companies
in financial distress, except for all the others. 130
Thank you very much.
[Applause]
MR. SODEN: Thank you, Judge Bernstein. That was absolutely
wonderful. I've learned a tremendous amount about Chapter 11. Of
course, if you ask Gus Katsoris, he'd tell you that's not a very high
threshold in my case.
Thank you all for coming this evening.
129. See End of Bankruptcy, supra note 41, at 751.
130. See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to
Professor Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 109, 126 (conceding that bankruptcy
may not always preserve the value of its creditors or "save" businesses, but establishing
and justifying several strengths and benefits of the Chapter 11 process).
